双寡头P2P网贷平台市场中交叉网络效应与价格非中性之间传导机制的实证研究

An Empirical Study on the Transmission Mechanism between the Cross Network Effect and Non-neutrality Price in Duopoly P2P Market

本文构建了一个出借人单边多归属的双寡头竞争模型,基于中国的P2P平台面板数据,利用似不相关估计方法对影响平台双边用户市场份额的相关参数进行估计,研究结果显示,P2P平台中的出借人实质上享有补贴,原因在于投资人相对于借款人对于平台间的价格差异更为敏感,并且出借人获取的交叉网络效应高于借款人,从而导致借贷双方之间的非对称价格结构;尽管加强透明度建设可以有效吸引投资者,但是透明度建设需要极大增加平台成本,同时考虑到交叉网络效应的存在导致平台在出借人一边存在正的机会成本,现实中,平台宁愿将更多投资投入到线下借款项目的发掘中,以及通过保证收益的方式吸引更多的出借人加入平台;同时,出借人多归属性能有效降低平台的垄断性。

This paper constructs a competition model of duopoly P2 Plending platform based on investor's multi-home.Based on the data of Chinese P2 Plending platforms,this paper uses the SUR method to estimate the parameters of the bilateral user market share demand function.The results show that the investors are essentially subsidized.The reason is that investors are more sensitive to the borrower's evaluation than the borrower's sensitivity to the investor's assessment,and more sensitive to price differences between platforms than borrowers,which result in the asymmetric price structure between the two parties.Although the increased transparency construction can effectively attract investors,because the transparency of construction needs to greatly increase the platform cost,taking into account the existence of cross network effect leads to the existence of positive side of platform of opportunity cost.In reality,the platform would prefer to invest more in the exploration of offline borrowing projects,and to attract more lenders to the platform by guaranteeing revenue.At the same time,the lender multi-home can effectively reduce the monopoly of the platform.