参与方情绪对土地征收补偿策略的影响研究——基于RDEU演化博弈视角

The Influence of Participant's Emotion on Land Expropriation Compensation Strategy——Based on RDEU Evolutionary Game Theory

将等级依赖期望效用理论与演化博弈理论相结合,构建土地征收补偿的RDEU演化博弈模型,探讨土地征收补偿中主要参与方农民和地方政府的情绪对博弈策略的影响状况。稳定性分析显示与以往结论不同的是,"乐观情绪会带来好的结果,悲观情绪会带来差的结果"仅仅在一方理性一方有情绪的组合状态下才符合。当参与方都具有悲观或乐观情绪时,双方的异质性信念互动反而使征地博弈没有演化稳定均衡。MATLAB仿真结果表明,具有情绪的一方悲观或乐观情绪程度的改变将会影响博弈均衡状态,且地方政府的情绪状态更易影响均衡结果。最后,针对征地矛盾的治理问题,提出建立情绪监督与疏导机制等建议。

The article constructs land expropriation compensation RDEU evolutionary game model to study the influence of the emotions of farmers and local governments on game strategies by combining rank dependent expected utility theory with evolutionary game theory.The stability analysis shows that it is different from previous conclusions,'optimism brings good results,and pessimism brings bad results'only appears when the game is played between a rational player and an emotional player.When the participants are both pessimistic or optimistic,the interaction of heterogeneous beliefs makes the land expropriation game have no evolutionary stable equilibrium.The MATLAB simulation results show that the change of the pessimistic or optimistic mood of the emotional party will affect the equilibrium state of the game,and the emotional state of the local government is more likely to affect the equilibrium result.Finally,the paper puts forward some suggestions for solving the problem of land expropriation conflicts,such as to establish emotional persuasion mechanism.