连锁董事网络位置、联结强度对高管薪酬粘性的治理:促进还是抑制?

The Governance of Network Location and Interlocks Strength of Interlocking Board on Stickiness of Executive Compensation:Promotion or Inhibition?

限薪令的颁布并未改变高管天价薪酬、粘性特征凸显的现状。基于社会网络理论与弱联结优势理论,本文构建了公司层面的董事网络中心度,引入董事联结强度这一情境因素,考察连锁董事网络对高管薪酬粘性的作用路径及治理效果。研究表明,董事网络中心度越高,高管薪酬粘性越弱;外部董事弱联结促进了二者的负相关性,内部董事强联结抑制了二者的负相关性。进一步区分第一大股东性质后发现,相比国有控股企业,非国有控股企业中联结强度的调节效应更为显著,外部董事弱联结的促进作用和内部董事强联结的抑制作用都得到进一步增强。

The promulgation of the salary restriction order has not changed the status quo of sky-high price and stickiness of executive compensation.Based on the social network theory and the weak interlocks advantage theory,this paper constructs the board network centrality at the company level,introduces the situational factor of board interlocks strength,and investigates the action path and governance effect of interlocking board network on stickiness of executive compensation.The results show that there is a negative correlation between board network centrality and stickiness of executive compensation,which is promoted by weak interlocks of external directors but inhibited by strong interlocks of internal directors.After distinguishing the first major shareholder nature,further research finds that compared with state-holding enterprises,the regulating effect of interlocks strength is more significant on non-state-holding enterprises,and the promoting effect from weak interlocks of external directors and the inhibiting effect from strong interlocks of internal directors are further enhanced.This study analyzes the strength of internal and external interlocks relations of board network structure,and provides enlightenment for governance mechanism of executive compensation stickiness from the two aspects of network location and interlocks strength.