央企董事会试点:治理规范影响国企创新吗?——来自国有上市公司的经验证据

Board of Directors Pilot of Central Government-owned Enterprises(CGOEs):Does the Governance Norm Affect the Innovation of State-Owned Companies?——Empirical Evidence From State-Owned Listed Companies

央企董事会试点是完善央企内部治理结构,规范其对国有上市公司股东权利履行的重要举措。本文以2003—2015年国有上市公司为样本,从创新的视角实证检验了央企董事会试点的实施效果及其作用机制。结果发现,央企董事会试点显著促进了国有上市公司创新水平的提高;具体而言,董事会试点对央企治理结构的优化缓解了政府干预问题,通过降低政策性负担、释放创新资源促进了国有上市公司创新水平的提升。且这一正向作用在央企持股比例较低、市场化水平较落后、金字塔层级更高以及竞争性国有上市公司中更为显著。上述结论不仅丰富了控股股东治理效应的相关研究,也为央企董事会试点实施的积极效果提供了经验证据,从而对深化国有企业的治理改革具有重要政策含义。

The Board of Directors pilot of CGOEs is a vital measure to perfect the internal management structure of the Central enterprise and to standardize its implementation of the shareholder rights of the state-owned listed companies.This paper takes Chinese State-Owned listed companies from 2003 to 2015 as a sample and,from the perspective of innovation,tested the implementation of the Board of Directors pilot of CGOEs and the effectiveness of the mechanism.The results demonstrate that the Board of Directors pilot of CGOEs has greatly promoted the innovation of stateowned listed companies.Specifically,the optimization of the governance structure of central enterprises by the Board of Directors has alleviated the problem of government intervention,and promoted the innovation level of state-owned listed companies by reducing policy burdens and releasing innovative resources.And this positive effect is more pronounced in the central enterprises with lower shareholding ratio,lower marketization level,higher pyramid level and competitive state-owned listed companies.The above conclusions not only enrich the relevant research on the governance effect of controlling shareholders,but also provide empirical evidence for the positive effects of the Board of Directors pilot of CGOEs,which has important policy implications for deepening the governance reform of state-owned enterprises.