摘要
高质量的信息披露不仅有助于利益相关者掌握组织运营状况与财务信息,减少信息搜集成本,提高决策效率,而且有助于降低信息不对称程度,抑制代理人的自利行为,优化资源配置。本文以2005—2013年中国社会组织网所披露的基金会为研究样本,实证检验了官方微博对非营利组织信息披露质量的影响及其作用机制。研究发现,开通官方微博的基金会信息披露质量更高,这一现象在秘书长兼任理事长的基金会中更为明显;同时还发现高管薪酬激励与官方微博对提高非营利组织信息披露质量具有替代作用。
High quality of information disclosure will not only help stakeholders to grasp organizational operation and financial information,reduce the cost of information gathering,improve the efficiency of decision-making,but also help to reduce the degree of information asymmetry,inhibit the self-interest behavior of agents,and optimize the allocation of resources.In this paper,based on a sample of the foundation disclosed by China social organizations network from 2005 to 2013,we empirically examines the influence of Weibo on the quality of information disclosure of Non-profit Organization(NPO)and its mechanism of action.The study found that the quality of information disclosure of the foundation which has opened the official Weibo was higher,and it was more obvious in the foundation which the secretary-general is also director-general.At the same time,it also found that executive compensation incentive and Weibo have an alternative effect on improving the quality of information disclosure of Non-profit Organization(NPO).This finding enriches the research on the factors that influence the quality of information disclosure of Non-profit Organization(NPO),expands the literature on the governance effect of'we-media'and has a certain references for information disclosure and internal and external governance of Non-profit Organization(NPO).
作者
程博
CHENG Bo(Jiyang College,Zhejiang A&F University,Hangzhou 311300,China)
出处
《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第7期52-67,共16页
Modern Finance and Economics:Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金青年项目(12CGL121)
浙江农林大学暨阳学院人才启动项目(JY2018RC01)
关键词
微博自媒体
信息披露质量
领导权结构
高管薪酬激励
Weibo
the quality of information disclosure
leadership structure
executive compensation incentive