摘要
实体企业金融化是近年不可忽视的一种现象。以2008—2017年非金融类A股上市公司为样本,考察实体企业金融资产配置对高管薪酬差距的影响。研究发现:金融资产配置有助于高管获取超额薪酬;当金融资产配置的收益为正时,其扩大高管外部薪酬差距的效应更明显;企业配置不同获益类型的金融资产会对高管外部薪酬差距和高管-员工薪酬差距产生差异化影响;国有企业金融资产配置缓解高管-员工薪酬差距效应显著;'平滑动机'、'扭亏动机'在金融资产配置和两类薪酬差距间发挥了不同的调节效应。本研究拓展了金融资产配置经济后果与薪酬差距影响因素的研究,同时也为企业高管薪酬契约设计和政府部门分类监管金融投资行为提供了微观证据。
The financialization of entities has received much attention in recent years.This paper takes samples of A-share listed non-financial companies from 2008 to 2017 to study the impact of financial asset allocation on executive compensation gap.We find that:financial asset allocation helps executives get excess compensation.Financial asset allocation with positive returns widens external executive compensation gap significantly.The allocation of different profitable types of financial assets has different impacts on external executive compensation gap and executive-employee compensation gap.In SOEs,financial asset allocation has a significant effect on narrowing executive-employee compensation gap.The motives of executives to smooth and to turn losses into profit have different moderating effects on the relationship between financial asset allocation and two types of compensation gap.This paper expands the research on the economic consequences of financial asset allocation and the factors affecting compensation gaps.It also provides evidence for corporates to design executive compensation contracts and for government departments to supervise financial investment by classifications.
作者
万旭仙
王虹
何佳
WAN Xu-xian;WANG Hong;HE Jia(Business School,Sichuan University,Chengdu 610064,China)
出处
《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第9期25-39,共15页
Modern Finance and Economics:Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(17BJY176)
关键词
金融资产配置
高管外部薪酬差距
高管-员工薪酬差距
financial asset allocation
external executive compensation gap
executive-employee compensation gap