摘要
以我国上市公司的并购案例为研究样本,探讨终极所有权结构对关联并购行为的影响。研究发现,终极控股股东两权分离程度越大,关联并购发生的更为频繁;随着现金流权比例的提高,会显著降低关联并购行为的发生;当终极控制人为国有控股时,更容易发生关联并购活动。此外,在具有两权分离的上市公司中,关联并购显著降低了收购公司价值;无两权分离的上市公司中,关联并购并未显著影响收购公司价值。研究结论丰富了关联并购决策差异的经验证据,为解释我国上市公司关联并购行为提供了新的理论视角。
Based on the M&A cases of Listed Companies in China as samples,this paper explores the impact of the ultimate ownership structure on the related M&A.We find that the greater the degree of the control-ownership wedge,the more frequent the related M&A occurs;with the increase of the proportion of cash flow rights,the occurrence of related M&A will be significantly reduced;when the ultimate controlling shareholder is state-owned,related M&A activities is more likely to occur.In addition,for the listed companies with the control-ownership wedge,related M&A significantly reduces the value of the acquisition company.For the listed companies without the control-ownership wedge,related M&A do not significantly affect the value of the acquisition company.In this paper,the ownership structure from the perspective of ultimate ownership is integrated into a unified framework to analyze its impact on related mergers and acquisitions.The conclusions enrich the empirical evidence of the differences in decision-making of related M&A,and provide a new theoretical perspective for explaining the related M&A of listed companies in China.
作者
蒋薇
张晓明
JIANG Wei;ZHANG Xiao-ming(School of Economics&Management,Northwest University,Xi’an 710127,China)
出处
《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第9期69-85,共17页
Modern Finance and Economics:Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
基金
陕西省软科学研究计划项目(2017KRM057)
关键词
两权分离
控制权私利
关联并购
终级所有权
the control-ownership wedge
private benefits of control
related mergers and acquisitions