地方政府财政压力、官员晋升激励与土地财政行为:理论分析与实证检验

Local Government Fiscal Pressures,Promotion Incentives and Land Fiscal Behaviour:Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Test

在地方政府过度依赖土地财政及土地财政负面效应外溢的经济背景下,本文基于官员晋升激励和地方财政压力的双重视角,通过构建'中央—地方—居民'三部门博弈下地方政府实施土地财政行为的决策机理模型,剖析了土地财政扩张的体制根源,并利用1999—2017年的省际面板数据,从静态和动态的双重维度估计了官员晋升激励与财政压力影响土地财政的空间滞后模型,探究地方政府间土地财政行为的策略互动特征及其增长惯性。研究发现:官员晋升激励和财政压力均显著推动了土地财政扩张,且前者的估计结果十分稳健,而后者在统计上并不稳健;地方政府的土地财政行为存在明显的策略互动特征;土地财政存在惯性增长的'棘轮效应'和动态累积态势,这是地方政府难以摆脱土地财政路径依赖的关键。进一步地,通过构建官员晋升激励综合指数、测算包含转移支付收入的财政压力及更换土地财政度量指标等方法进行稳健性检验,结果也支持了以上结论。这对于完善地方官员考核体系、理顺不同级次政府间财政关系以及改革城乡二元土地管理制度具有一定的理论意义和政策启示。

Under the economic background of local government’s excessive dependence on land finance and the spillover of negative effects of land finance,this paper innovatively looks at the dual perspective of official promotion incentive and local financial pressure.By constructing the decisionmaking mechanism model of land finance behavior implemented by local government under the game of'central,local and resident',this paper analyzes the institutional root of land financial expansion,and makes use of the provincial panel data of 1999-2017.This paper estimates the spatial lag model of the influence of official promotion incentive and financial pressure on land finance from the two dimensions of static and dynamic,and probes into the strategic interaction characteristics and growth inertia of land finance behavior among local governments.It is found that the promotion incentive and financial pressure of officials have significantly promoted the expansion of land finance,and the estimated results of the former are very robust,while the latter is not statistically sound.The land finance behavior of the local government has the obvious horizontal strategy interaction characteristic,and the land finance has the'ratchet effect'and the dynamic accumulation trend of the inertia growth,which is the key that the local government can not get rid of the dependence of the land finance path.Furthermore,the results of conservatism test,which include the financial pressure of transfer payment income and the financial measurement index of land replacement,also support the above conclusion by constructing the comprehensive index of official promotion incentive.The results have certain theoretical significance and policy enlightenment for perfecting the assessment system of local officials,straightening out the financial relations between different levels of governments and reforming the dual land management system between urban and rural areas.