摘要
公司治理是决定日本企业过度现金持有的主要影响因素。因此近年来日本的公司治理改革通过引入和完善外部监督机制,对管理层通过现金持有直接谋取私利等行为确实起到了一定的抑制作用。但另一方面,日本企业对现金持有的偏好,也是针对日本偏向于经营者控制的公司治理体系的适应性反应。因此,日本的公司治理改革需要对经营者控制和经营者监督加以权衡,这样才能从主观偏好和客观条件两方面减少日本企业的过度现金持有,才能提高企业资源的配置效率。
Corporate governance is the main factor in determining the excessive cash holdings of Japanese companies. Therefore,in recent years,Japan’s corporate governance reform has indeed played a certain role in restraining the management’s direct pursuit of private interests through cash holdings. On the other hand,the preference of Japanese companies for cash holdings is also an adaptive response to the corporate governance system that Japan prefers to control its operators. Therefore,Japan’s corporate governance reform needs to weigh the operator control and operator supervision,so as to reduce the excessive cash holdings of Japanese companies from the subjective preferences and objective conditions,in order to improve the efficiency of the allocation of enterprise resources.
作者
张玉新
ZHANG Yuxin(School of Economics,Jilin University,Changchun,Jilin,130012,China)
出处
《现代日本经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第2期48-58,共11页
Contemporary Economy OF Japan
基金
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目"新一轮东北振兴与东亚合作研究"(16JJD790013)