基于博弈视角的国家对认证机构监管研究

Research on National Supervision of Certification Bodies Based on Game Perspective

认证市场监管合力不够、认证机构的服务质量不高等原因导致认证质量和认证证书的公信力下降。基于此背景,文章建立了监管部门和认证机构的静态博弈模型,得出了当监管部门查处认证机构所带来的正面效用越大,越倾向于进行监管等结论,并提出了监管对策,对于强化对认证机构的监管具有重要意义。

The insufficient supervision of the certification market and the poor service quality of certification bodies resulted in the decline of the certification quality and the credibility of certification certificates. The paper established a static game model between supervision authorities and certification bodies, and reached the conclusion that the greater the positive effect brought by the supervision departments, the more inclined to supervise. The paper also put forward countermeasures to improve the supervision capacity, which is of great significance to strengthen the supervision of certification bodies.