当法律责任理论遭遇认知神经科学

When the Theory of Legal Liability Encounters the Cognitive Neuroscience——the Challenge from Cognitive neuroscience and the Response from the Theory of Legal Liability

法律责任理论在学界已经成熟并形成通说,与认知神经科学的"遭遇",使得法律责任理论的某些内容受到挑战。这一挑战主要针对法律责任中内在蕴含的自由意志,原有的法学理论中的自由意志,立足于大众心理学,主要从外在行动来分析和判断当事人的主观方面。如果像认知神经科学家所说的那样不存在自由意志,那么法律责任理论就难以维系。但现有的整个法律责任理论与法律理论体系仍然强调作为法律主体的"人"的存在,拒绝将人的行为还原为某些脑区的活动和神经传递结果。整体而言,认知神经科学会影响到对法律责任主观方面的认定和对期待可能性的判断,但仍然无法撼动当前主流的法律责任理论。

The theory of legal liability was challenged when it encounter the cognitive neuroscience. This challenge is mainly on the free will in the legal theory, which is based on folk psychology and analyzes people's subjective parts through people's behavior. If the free will doesn't exist, as some cognitive neuroscientists insist, the mainstream legal liability theory can not continue. But the current legal liability theory still emphasizes the existence of legal subjects——human, and refuses reducing people's behavior into the action of certain brain region and neural signal transmission. In general, cognitive neuroscience can affect the judgment of the subjective parts of the theory of legal liability and expectant possibility, but can not change or substitute the current theory of legal liability.