如何在司法权虚弱的条件下确立合宪性审查?

The Birth of Constitutional Review of the Laws and the Cowardice of Judicial Power

法律的合宪性审查机制与司法权的地位存在先天关联。在法国政治传统中,司法权一直受到怀疑和排斥因此地位低下,甚至不被视为国家权力的一种,因此,法庭不得干涉立法权的行使或停止法律的执行,甚至不得干预行政职能。宪法裁判权由此被认为必然侵害政治权威而一直受到否定。在1958年宪法中,宪法委员会绝非一个最高法院,而是一个调整议会与政府权限、实现理性化议会制的工具。但宪法委员会在判例中不断拓展裁判权,不仅使裁判权得到实践确认和默示的宪法化,而且逐渐创立了一个支持合宪性审查有效开展的空间。承担合宪性审查职能的法官也必然与承担普通裁判职能的法官产生对话与互动。

The constitutional review of the laws is born to be connected with the role of judicial power. In French political tradition, judicial power is always humble because of constant distrust and reject,adjudication isn't even regarded as a power, therefore, the court couldn't interfere with the exercise of legislative power, nor the execution of laws, not even the exercise of administrative power. Constitutional justice which is deemed to infringethe political sovereignty is always denied. In the 1958 Constitution, the Constitutional Council is a tool of rationalized parliament which regulates the relations between parliament andgovernment, rather than a supreme court. But the Constitutional Council keeps in expanding judicial power in its decisions, which results in not only the implied constitutionalization of judicial power, but alsothe establishment of constitutional review of the laws. The constitutional judge is necessarily in dialogue and interactive with the ordinary judges.