考虑服务成本的两寡头B2B电子中介差异化定价决策行为

Differential Pricing Strategy of Duopoly Considering Cost-to-Serve for B2B E-Intermediary

B2B电子中介可基于其在服务卖方企业过程中产生的不同成本,对卖方企业实施差异化定价以提高利润,但这一差异化定价决策行为还受到行业中其他竞争者的影响。因此,通过考虑卖方企业服务成本的差异,构建一个两阶段、两寡头垄断的B2B电子中介差异化定价决策模型,探讨竞争环境下服务成本高低不同的卖方企业对B2B电子中介定价和利润的影响。研究结果表明,B2B电子中介针对高服务成本卖方企业采取的定价高于低服务成本卖方企业。这一差异化定价下,当行业中高服务成本卖方企业的数量低于低服务成本卖方企业时,增加高服务成本卖方企业的数量更有利于B2B电子中介从自身或者竞争对手中获得更多的利润.因此,高服务成本卖方企业值得保留,且保留条件是高低服务成本差异足够高以及高服务成本卖方企业所占比足够低。

B2 B e-intermediary can increase profit by strategically discriminating its existing sellers based on their cost-to-serve. However, prior research has not examined how B2 B e-intermediary may differentially charge its existing sellers taking into account future competition for these sellers, and hence cannot investigate the effect of B2 B customer retention strategy of the e-intermediary on competitive intensity in the marketplace. Therefore, this paper develops a two-period monopoly model with differential cost-to-serve, and focuses on discussing the impact of cost-to-serve on price and profit in a competitive context. The results show that B2 B e-intermediary charges higher prices from high-cost sellers than from low-cost sellers. In particular, when the proportion of high-cost sellers is lower than that of low-cost sellers in the marketplace, it can be profitable for B2 B e-intermediary to retain high-cost sellers. This finding suggests that in competitive settings, B2 B e-intermediary can benefit from strategically keeping its high-cost sellers.