“先验偶然命题”经典案例新探

A Novel Study of Classical Contingent A Priori Cases

克里普克在《命名与必然性》中通过'标准米'与'海王星'案例分析断言:有些先验命题是偶然真的,以此挑战分析哲学关于'所有先验真理都是必然真理'的传统观点,引起了学界关于其是否能够真正构成对传统观点反驳的持续争论。先验偶然论的支持者埃文斯提出的'朱利叶斯'案例,也得到了学界广泛讨论。在辨析有关论争的基础上,通过严格区分指称固定与意义给予,以及严格区分认识论与形而上学范畴,对克里普克经典案例进行重塑,可以对它们是否构成传统观点的反驳给予肯定性回答。

In Naming and Necessity,Saul A.Kripke claims that there are cases of contingent a priori:Standard Meter and Neptune.If Standard Meter and Neptune are genuine,they can challenge the traditional belief that'all a priori truth are necessary'.However,whether they really refute the traditional belief or not,that is not an easy question.So far,the two cases continues to be discussed in contemporary literature.As one of the proponents of contingent a priori,Gareth Evans offers Julies case,which is also hotly debated.By a critical study of the relevant arguments about these cases,this paper employs the methodology of distinguishing reference-fixing from meaning-giving and the methodology of distinguishing categories of epistemology from categories of metaphysics to reformulate classical cases,and argues that they can be considered to be a refutation of the above-mentioned traditional belief.