摘要
运用HM模型与MATLAB工具设计了海绵城市PPP项目运营维护服务契约新方案,新方案揭示:固定报酬具有引入运营维护契约的必要性与迫切性;监督的存在更益于运营维护道德风险的防范;政府最优监督策略选择的根据是k、h、ΔEV三者的耦合关系。
Using HM model and MATLAB tool, this paper designs a novel scheme of operation and maintenance service contract in Sponge City PPP project. This scheme reveals that operation and maintenance service contract has the necessity and urgency to introduce the fixed remuneration. The existence of supervision is more beneficial for fending off moral risk. Also, the choice of government’s optimal monitoring strategy is based on the coupling relationship between k,h and ΔEV.
作者
王小丽
王卓甫
丁继勇
WANG Xiao-li;WANG Zhuo-fu;DING Ji-yong(Business School,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100)
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第3期127-132,共6页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71402045)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(2017B18114)
关键词
海绵城市PPP
运营维护服务契约
委托代理理论
监督
固定报酬
Sponge-City PPP project
operation and maintenance service contract
principal-agent theory
monitoring
fixed remuneration
