共享单车平台的定价与服务能力决策研究

On Decision-making of Pricing and Service Capacity of Sharing-bicycle Platform

研究了延时敏感顾客行为下共享单车平台的定价和服务能力决策问题。通过建立排队模型,分析了延时敏感顾客选择行为下,以共享单车平台利润最大化、社会福利最大化为目标时的最优价格和单车数量决策。结果表明,当考虑平台利润最大化时,只有当平台投资利率比顾客投资利率高一个阈值时,平台会提供服务,并且最大限度地采购单车;当考虑社会福利最大化时,只有当社会治理成本较低时,平台会提供服务。由于考虑了押金投资收益,平台利润最大化时的价格比社会福利最大化时的价格低,并且平台利润最大化时的最优价格随着平台投资收益利率的提高而降低,随着平均使用时间的增加而降低,随着顾客的延时敏感程度的增加而降低;社会福利最大化时的最优价格随着顾客投资利率的提高而降低,随着顾客单次使用平均时间的增加而降低,随着顾客的延时敏感程度的增加而降低。

This paper studies the problems about how to make a strategy decision in pricing and service capacity of the sharing bicycle platform related with the delay-sensitive customer behavior.By building aqueuing model,the optimal price and the number of bicycles decision-making considering the delaysensitive customer’s behavior with the goal of maximizing the platform’s profit or the social welfare are analyzed.The results show that when considering the maximization of the platform’s profit,the platform will provide services only when the platform’s investment interest rate is higher enough than the customer’s investment interest rate,and will purchase the maximum number of bicycles;while considering the maximization of the social welfare,only when the cost of the social governance is lower enough,the platform will provide services.Because of considering the investment return of the deposit,the price when the platform profit is maximized is lower than the price when the social welfare is maximized,the price when the platform profit is maximized decreases in the interest rate of the platform investment,and decreases in the time of customer using bicycles,and decreases at the delaysensitivity level of the customer.The optimal price when social welfare is maximized decreases in customer’s investment interest rate,decreases in each single time using bicycles,and decreases at the customer’s delay-sensitive level.