营销数据服务外包中的关系契约设计

Relational Contract Design in Marketing Data Service Outsourcing

在营销数据服务外包环境下,市场销量受到服务商的数据服务质量和客户企业的营销努力的共同影响。由于服务商的数据服务质量不可合同化,客户企业需要基于市场销量来激励数据服务商的数据服务质量的投入。此外,客户企业的营销努力也不可合同化,因而服务商将面临客户企业营销努力投入不足的道德风险。正式契约无法有效激励双方的质量与努力水平,针对在营销数据服务外包中存在的双边道德风险问题,进行了关系契约的设计,分析了客户企业贴现因子在关系契约中对双方收益的影响。通过分析可知,对于任意的收益贴现因子,外包双方实施关系契约总是能得到优于正式契约的结果,当贴现因子大于某一临界值时,关系契约能有效激励双方的质量与努力水平,实现系统最优收益。在营销数据服务外包中,客户企业可以通过关系契约与数据服务商建立长期合作关系,基于客户企业承诺的激励机制可以有效提高数据服务商的服务质量,进而提高双方的收益,实现双赢。

In the marketing data service outsourcing environment,the sales volume is influenced by the data service quality of the service providers and the marketing effort of the client enterprise.The unverifiable input of both parties in the implementation of marketing data service often results in bilateral moral hazard,which cannot be effectively solved by traditional formal contracts.In this study,a relational contract is used to incentivize the joint efforts of both parties.It is shown that,for any discount factor,the relational contract is not inferior to the formal contract.That is,with the relational contract,both customer benefits and system benefits are not less than the formal contract.Moreover,with the increase of the discount factor,the relational contract outperforms the formal contract significantly.When the discount factor is greater than a certain threshold value,the relational contract can effectively stimulate the efforts of both parties and achieve the win-win outcomes.