摘要
随着高教体制改革的深入,厘清公立高校所涉及的委托代理关系,分析和解决其存在的委托代理问题迫在眉睫。公有产权下解决委托代理问题的关键,是设计激励、约束和竞争制度来排斥信息效率低下和激励不相容问题。
This article defines the Principle-Agent relationship between government, individual and public higher education institution, offers an analysis of their Principle-Agent problem. On the basis of the analysis, the suggestions and advices are dwelled on how to attain the information efficiency and mutual encouragement.
出处
《高等教育研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第1期43-46,共4页
Journal of Higher Education
关键词
公立高校
政府
个人
委托代理
public higher education institution
government
individual
Principal-Agent