比利时联邦政府改革十年:高层管理者自主权与横向部级部门的监督之间取得了怎样的平衡?

The reform of the Belgian federal administration 10 years on:what balance has been achieved between operational autonomy of top managers and the supervision carried out by the horizontal ministerial departments?

作为'哥白尼改革'的结果,比利时联邦政府高级公务员目前依据固定期限合同任命,并且要根据管理计划来实现绩效。本文着手评估比利时联邦政府任期制的引入,一方面对于负责横向部门预算的高级公务员自主权的影响,另一方面对于比利时联邦政府人力资源的影响。基于所谓的'不一致性'研究视角,本文简略地关注三种不一致性:内在的、离散的和情境的不一致性。这些不一致性的分析,确证了胡德和洛奇(Hood and Lodge)提出的部长和高级公务员之间存在的一种'欺骗'形式(2006),即前者倾向于通过维持正式或非正式的资源供给控制机制来减少后者的自主权空间。

In the wake of the Copernic reform,Belgium's senior federal civil servants are now appointed for a fixed term and guided on performance via management plans.This article sets out to assess the impact of the introduction of the fixed-term system on the autonomy of senior civil servants with regard to the horizontal departments responsible for the budget,on the one hand,and human resources,on the other hand,within Belgium's federal administration.Based on the so-called'inconsistencies'approach,the article focuses briefly on three inconsistencies:internal,discursive and contextual.An analysis of these inconsistencies confirms one of the forms of'cheating'in the relationship between ministers and senior civil servants formulated by Hood and Lodge(2006),namely that the first can be inclined to reduce the margin of discretion of the latter by maintaining formal or informal mechanisms to exercise control over the provision of resources.