独立机构问责的经验评估:体制方法以及在德国联邦网络局的应用

The empirical assessment of agency accountability:a regime approach and an application to the German Bundesnetzagentur

许多情况下,监管责任被委托给了独立机构,由此产生的问题是这些独立机构的民主问责制如何保证。目前没有多少经验方法能保障独立机构的问责。我们提供的方法具体有以下三方面:第一,我们仔细分析了独立机构在法理上(问责通过问责'法庭'的正式权利得以保障,以获得信息和承担后果)和在实际上(法庭根据资源和影响其制裁资格可信性的判决成本运用这些权利的能力)两方面的问责。第二,问责必须在政治、操作和管理三个层次上分别进行评估。第三,在上述每个层次上,由一个若干相互依赖的法庭所组成的系统来实施问责,从而共同形成一个问责体制。本文将此分析框架运用于适宜进行经验分析的德国联邦网络局问责体制案例。对实践工作者的启示监管型独立机构通常被认为是独立的,同时也是负责任的。本论文提供了一个问责'体制'研究的现实框架,监管型独立机构深受该'体制'的影响。该框架强调,必须区分各种主体(问责法庭),各个独立机构在形式上要向它们负责(议会委员会、审计机构、法院等),同时还要考虑这些主体之间的各种可能的关系。我们认为官方文件定义里的正式的'书面'问责,没有完全阐明实际问责。实际问责取决于法庭拥有的资源(主要是信息处理和决策能力)及其制裁能力的可信性。本论文将此框架应用于德国联邦网络局。

Regulation has in many cases been delegated to independent agencies,which has led to the question of how democratic accountability of these agencies is ensured.There are few empirical approaches to agency accountability.We offer such an approach,resting upon three propositions.First,we scrutinize agency accountability both de jure(accountability is ensured by formal rights of accountability’fora’to receive information and impose consequences)and de facto(the capability of fora to use these rights depends on resources and decision costs that affect the credibility of their sanctioning capacity).Second,accountability must be evaluated separately at political,operational and managerial levels.And third,at each level accountability is enacted by a system of several(partially)interdependent fora,forming together an accountability regime.The proposed framework is applied to the case of the German Bundesnetzagentur’s accountability regime,which shows its suitability for empirical purposes.Points for practitioners Regulatory agencies are often considered as independent,yet accountable.This article provides a realistic framework for the study of accountability’regimes’in which they are embedded.It emphasizes the need to identify the various actors(accountability fora)to which agencies are formally accountable(parliamentary committees,auditing bodies,courts,and so on)and to consider possible relationships between them.It argues that formal accountability’on paper’,as defined in official documents,does not fully account for de facto accountability,which depends on the resources possessed by the fora(mainly information-processing and decision-making capacities)and the credibility of their sanctioning capacities.The article applies this framework to the German Bundesnetzagentur.