授权后的政策属性与政治影响力——以欧盟专门机构为例

Policy properties and political influence in post-delegation:the case of EU agencies

相关文献已经对欧盟专门机构的设计以及授权后的政治控制与独立性问题进行了研究。然而,在这些专业文献中,却见不到测量和解释欧盟委员会、成员国以及欧洲议会对众多欧盟专门机构决策所产生的政治影响方面的研究。本文探讨这一主题并提出以下疑问:每个主要的上级机构对欧盟机构管理委员会的决策有多大影响力?欧盟专门机构的权力和政策属性会反作用于政治影响吗?本文以在线调查、文献分析和半结构式访谈为基础,结合定量研究和定性研究,辨明了超国家主体和政府间主体发挥政治影响力的不同模式。研究结果显示,欧盟机构的监管职能及其政治上的显要性降低了欧盟委员会和欧洲议会的影响力,而欧盟专门机构的复杂性则削弱了欧盟各成员国的影响力。此外,高度集权并且广泛的监管活动也影响了授权之后机构间的平衡。

The literature on EU agencies has examined the issue of political control and independence in EU agency design and in post-delegation.However,studies measuring and providing accounts for the political influence that the Commission,the member states and the European Parliament exert in decision-making across a wide sample of EU agencies are missing in the specialized literature.This article addresses this topic and poses the following questions:How influential is each of the main parent institutional actors on agency boards’decision-making?Do agency powers and policy properties affect political influence?Based on an online survey,documentary analysis and semistructured interviews,this article combines a quantitative and a qualitative study identifying differentiated patterns of political influence by supranational and intergovernmental actors.Regulatory functions and saliency decrease the leverage of the Commission and the European Parliament,whereas complexity decreases the influence of the member states.Moreover,highly centralized and far-reaching regulatory activity affects institutional balances in post-delegation.