政策变迁的动力与协同原因:银行家奖金案例的思考

On the forces of policy change and joint causation:insights from the banker’s bonus case

在公共政策文献中,为数不多的难以反驳的研究发现之一是:政策动态是政策稳定性与政策波动性的函数。尽管大多数公共政策制定理论都假定政策节点的出现是政策显著变化的必要条件,但是试图阐明这些政策节点的深层机制的研究还相当罕见。本文进一步探究政策节点这一理念,人们通常假设政策节点,从根本上引发了政策变迁的协同原因从而引起了重大变迁。我们以奖金监管的案例研究阐明变革力量的这种联合与强化的性质。基于文件分析和政治诉求分析,本文表明有关奖金监管的变动多数是小幅度边际性的。我们认为发放奖金的做法所导致的绩效奖励具有内在的吸引力,再加上就如何控制金融市场风险偏好而言,全然没有形成能够得到强大联盟支持的可替代性方案,这些因素似乎都对发放奖金做法的反弹具有重要作用。在理论方面,这个案例研究有助于发展有关重大政策变迁的协同原因理论。在实证方面,本研究揭示了金融部门抵制改革的关键机制:提供一个没人能拒绝的备选方案。对实践工作者的启示在政策研究文献中已形成了广泛的共识:政策变迁通常源自多重力量。我们辨析出这种引发政策变迁的起决定性作用的协同原因,并且表明,在这些变迁力量中,一项能够将广大的利益相关者联盟统合起来的强有力的政策替代方案是政策变迁的必要条件。因此金融业改革,特别是改变发放奖金的做法,不可能通过从严监管来实现;但是,通过提供真正能够奖励专业英才与控制风险偏好的替代性方案,可以做到这一点。

One of the few robust findings in the public policy literature is that policy dynamics are both a function of stability and volatility.And although most theories of public policy making posit the occurrence of policy junctures as necessary conditions for significant change,studies that set out to unravel the underlying mechanisms of such policy junctures remain relatively rare.This article further develops the idea of policy junctures, commonly hypothesized to initiate significant change,as essentially entailing joint causation.We illustrate the joint and reinforcing nature of forces of change with a case study of bonus regulation.Based on document analysis and a political claim analysis,this article shows that most changes in bonus regulation were of a marginal nature.We argue that the intrinsically attractive nature of performance rewards that a bonus practice entails combined with a sheer lack of alternatives supported by a strong coalition on how to curb risk appetite in financial markets seem to count for the resilience of bonus practices.Theoretically,the case study contributes to theory development on joint causation that causes major policy change.Empirically,it unravels a key mechanism employed by the financial sector to resist reforms:offering an alternative no one can refuse.Points for practitioners There is a broad consensus in the policy literature that policy change usually results from multiple forces.We identify this crucial jointly causal nature of policy change and suggest that among the forces of change a strong policy alternative capable of uniting a broad coalition of stakeholders is a necessary condition for policy change.Financial reforms,in particular the practice of bonus payment,are thus not likely to result from tight regulation,but rather from real alternatives on how to reward professional excellence and curb risk appetite.