论两主体情形下合作剩余的分配——以悬赏广告为例

Analysis on the Distribution of Cooperation Surplus under Two-person Circumstance

本文讨论在两经济主体的合作能够产生剩余的情况下 ,这些剩余如何在他们之间进行分配。以往研究提出了分配问题的几个可能的解 ,并对解的存在性和唯一性进行了讨论。但他们的分析或是直接对解用不可验证的公理进行描述 ;或是对个体偏好强加一些不可验证的假设 ,然后得到存在性或唯一性的结论。作者发现 ,运用类似于博弈论中多个策略均衡点存在时“聚点”决定解的唯一性的分析方法 ,可以得到这样的结论 :实际中多个解都可能存在 ,不同问题的不同解是由社会习俗决定的 ;即便是同一个问题 ,由于社会习俗的不同 ,也可能有不同形式的解 ;并且解的大小及其变化与社会习俗互有影响。接下来 ,作者以悬赏广告为例 ,对悬赏广告中悬赏金的大小进行求解。我们发现用前面的结论可以比较好地解释所得到的结果。另一方面 ,得到的结果在一定程度上也可以验证前面的结论。

This paper analyzes the solution to Nash's bargaining problem. There are many solutions in literature. Previous study discusses the existence and uniqueness of the solution, but they impose assumptions that can't be verified to the solution directly or to agent's preference. We follow Nash's model but without these assumptions that cannot be verified. Using method like 'focal point' methods in Game theory, we can get the following conclusions: many solutions can exist in reality, the different solutions to different problems are decided by the social convention; the value of the solution and its change interact with the social convention. We also provide an example that can be analyzed by the model: reward-offering advertisement.