摘要
文章从交易成本的角度考察了工资集体协商制度形成机制,认为交易成本是工资集体协商制度形成的决定性因素,尤其"风险交易成本"在其中起着举足轻重的作用。文章先分析了职工与企业就工资进行一对一协商交易成本过高,缺乏现实可行性。一般情况下,企业单方提供工资合约的行政决定制交易成本最低,因此这种工资决定机制在市场经济早期一度受到青睐。但随着市场经济的发展,企业单方制定工资合约掩盖的矛盾逐步显化,发生巨额风险交易成本的概率剧增,使劳资双方和国家都面临巨额风险交易成本,工资集体协商制度遂成为各方的理性选择。并据此就我国工资集体协商制度建设提出了相关建议。
The thesis analyses the general mechanism of the origin of the collective negotiating wage institution from the newpoints of the transaction cost.It argues that transaction cost,especially risk transaction cost,is the most important deciding factor.It is impossible that the every employee negotiates with corporation,we think.In general,the transaction cost in lowest when the corporation makes the salary contract alone,so the mechanism was welcome at the beginning of market economy.But the rate of the great risk transaction cost caused by the contradiction of corporation self-side made wage contract is getting up with the development of market economy.So the collective negotiation institution is optimum choice to all at last.In the end we give some advices on developing our country's collective negotiation wage institution.
出处
《华东经济管理》
2003年第6期43-46,共4页
East China Economic Management