期刊文献+

试论对中国上市公司反收购行为的规制 被引量:2

The Issues Concerning the Regulation of the Anti-takeover of Listed Companies in China
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摘要 得益于收购、反收购的政策解禁 ,中国的并购市场日益活跃。同时 ,反收购对中国监管当局与市场的挑战也越来越大。提出了对中国上市公司反收购行为规制的基本原则和若干重点。 The market of takeovers and mergers in China is brisk ing more and more because policies on takeover and anti takeover are made bette r.Meanwhile a new challenge about the anti takeover lies ahead of various super visory departments and markets of China. It puts forward basic principles and so me focal points concerning the regulation of the anti takeover of listed compan i es in China.
作者 黄金老
机构地区 中国银行
出处 《北京联合大学学报(人文社会科学版)》 2003年第2期25-32,共8页 Journal of Beijing Union University(Humanities and Social Sciences)
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参考文献3

  • 1张文璋,顾慧慧.我国上市公司并购绩效的实证研究[J].证券市场导报,2002(9):21-26. 被引量:30
  • 2[2]张金鑫,秦耀林,崔永梅.并购走进新时代前10月上市公司并购分析[N].中国证券报,2002-11-07(10).
  • 3范建德.自"利益输送"问题谈中、美保障少数股东权之法律制度[J].中国人民大学复印报刊资料台港澳及海外法学,1991,(9):34-35.

二级参考文献14

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  • 9选择了不同的T1,就采用了不同的干净期对预期收益进行估计。由于T1变动较小时对结果的影响很小,而且T1每变化一次计算量将增加一倍,所以我们选择10—60天中每隔5天进行计算。
  • 10我们假设并购业绩在一年多的时间内到体现。实际上,并购是一种长期的经济行为,业绩的全面体现可能需要更长时间。但是,我们无法获取我国上市公司并购前后多年的财务数掘。即使条件允许,我们也必须考虑业绩变化是否仅由并购所产生。所以本文仅考察上市公司并购后一年多时间内的业绩变化。

共引文献29

同被引文献12

  • 1叶卫平.英美董事义务与目标公司反收购[J].当代法学,2002,16(1):86-88. 被引量:11
  • 2张本照,杨善林,朱志雄.国外反收购对策股东财富效应的影响因素研究[J].世界经济,2005,28(7):69-78. 被引量:4
  • 3Alderfer,Clayton P.,1986."The Invisible Director on Corporate Boards." Harvard Business Review.64:38-52.
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  • 6Davidson Ⅲ,Wallace,Theodore Pilger,and Andrew Szakmary,1998."Golden Parachutes,Board and Committee Composition,and Shareholder Wealth." Financial Review.33:17-32.
  • 7Geoffrey P.Miller,2000."Takeovers:English and American."European Financial Management.6(4):533-54.
  • 8Hannah,L.,1974."Takeover Bids in Britain Before 1950:An Exercise in Business Pre-History." Business History.16:65.
  • 9Kesner,Idalene F.,1988."Directors' Characteristics and Committee Membership:An Investigation of Type,Occupation,Tenure,and Gender." Academy of Management Journal.31:66-84.
  • 10Myners,P.,2001."Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom:A Review." London:HM Treasury.

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