摘要
以供应商管理库存和第三方物流为背景,对第三方物流提供商、供应商和制造商在内的VMI&TPL供应链进行博弈分析,指出分散决策下参与者利益冲突会降低供应链效率。为提高分散决策下供应链的效率,提出基于分散决策的两方(第三方物流提供商&供应商或供应商&制造商)收益共享机制和三方收益共享机制。研究结果表明,相对于不存在收益共享的分散式供应链,采用两方收益共享机制可以提高供应链效率和所有参与者的利润;在两方收益共享机制中,制造商或第三方物流提供商在不参与两方收益共享机制时的利润更高,意味着不合作可能是更优选择;在三方收益共享机制中,为提高供应链总利润,第三方物流提供商在分散决策阶段将选择低于其成本的服务价格;尽管相对两方收益共享机制下的供应链效率更高,但三方收益共享机制仅当所有参与者讨价还价能力足够大时才会被采用。
In the context of vendor-managed inventory and third-party logistics,the game analysis for a VMI & TPL supply chain with one third-party logistics provider,one supplier,and one manufacturer is conducted,and it is pointed out that the supply chain is inefficient because of the parties' conflict of interest under decentralized decision-making.To resolve this,the two-party(third-party logistics provider &supplier or supplier & manufacturer)revenue sharing mechanism and three-party revenue sharing mechanism based on decentralized decision-making are proposed.The results demonstrate that,compared with the decentralized supply chain,two-party revenue sharing mechanism can increase the supply chain efficiency and all parties' profits.In particular,either the third-party logistics provider or the manufacturer can realize a higher profit if the firm does not participate in the two-party revenue sharing mechanism,implying that non-cooperation may be a better choice.Under the threeparty revenue sharing mechanism,in order to promote the total supply chain profit,the third-party logistics provider will choose a service price lower than her cost.Moreover,the three-party revenue sharing mechanism is adopted only when all parties are sufficiently powerful,though it can realize higher supply chain efficiency than the two-party revenue sharing mechanism.
出处
《武汉科技大学学报》
CAS
北大核心
2016年第5期393-400,共8页
Journal of Wuhan University of Science and Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71401129
71501147)
中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(2016M592340)
关键词
VMI
&
TPL供应链
收益共享机制
分散决策
博弈分析
VMI & TPL supply chain
revenue sharing mechanism
decentralized decision-making
game analysis