我国上市公司内部控制缺陷披露的治理效应研究——基于董事会领导结构的经验分析

Research on the Governance Effect of Internal Control Weakness Disclosure in Chinese Listed Companies——Empirical Analysis Based on the Board Leadership Structure

中国强制性内部控制信息披露制度实施时间较短,且上市公司内控缺陷披露比例较低,其公司治理效应有待检验。以中国2011~2012年两市A股上市公司为研究样本,检验中国企业内部控制缺陷披露所产生的治理效应。研究发现,两职合一的董事会领导结构不利于企业内部控制缺陷的披露;对于两职合一的企业而言,内控缺陷披露为上市公司改进内部治理结构提供了激励,提高了公司次年的两职人员变更率,但并没有真正起到促进两职人员分离的治理效应。

The time to implement the mandatory internal control information disclosure system in China is very short,and the proportion of internal control weakness disclosure in listed companies is low,so its effect on corporate governance needs to be examined. Based on the research samples of A- share listed companies in the two capital markets in China from 2011 to 2012,the governance effect of internal control weakness disclosure in Chinese enterprises is examined. The results show that CEO duality is not conducive to the disclosure of internal control weakness; For companies whose CEO concurrently holds chairman position,the disclosure of internal control weakness provides companies with incentives to improve the internal governance structure and increases the turnover rate of employees with CEO duality in the following year,but it does not exert real governance effect of promoting the separation of CEO duality.