进入壁垒、审慎监管与银行风险承担——利率市场化条件下的理论与实证

Barriers to Entry, Prudential Regulation and Risk Taking of Banks: Theories and Empirical Researches under the Condition of Interest Rate Liberalization

利率市场化对于形成有效的利率机制而言还只是初步的,需要进一步降低银行业进入壁垒,拓展银行业竞争的广度和深度。由于道德风险,竞争加剧有可能导致银行增加风险承担行为,加强银行监管是防范和化解相关金融风险的可选应对手段。通过构建动态道德风险模型,并采用跨国宏观、微观数据,在利率市场化的前提下,对银行业进入壁垒、银行监管和银行风险承担行为三者之间的关系进行理论和实证研究。发现降低银行业进入壁垒会收窄利差和净息差,增加银行风险承担行为,但这一影响随银行监管水平的提高而减弱直至消失。研究为中国利率市场化后的金融改革方向提供了一种思路。

Interest rate liberalization is necessary but just preliminary for the formation of an effective interest rate mechanism. More efforts should be done by further lowering the barriers to entry of banking industry and expand the width and depth of banking industry competition. Due to moral hazard, increased competition may lead banks to increase their risk taking behaviors, so strengthening banking supervision is an alternative means to prevent and defuse related financial risks. By creating a dynamic moral hazard model and using cross-border macro and micro data, this paper explores the relationships among entry barriers of banking industry, bank regulation and risk taking behaviors of banks theoretically and empirically under the premise of interest rate liberalization. The authors find out that reducing barriers to entry of banking industry will narrow spreads and net interest margins, and increase the risk taking behaviors of banks. However, the effect weakens and disappears with the enhancement of banking regulation. The research provides a way about the direction of China’s financial reform after interest rate liberalization.