政治治理、管理层权力与隐性腐败——基于权力约束政策的视角

Political Governance,Managerial Power and Hidden Corruption:Based on the Perspective of Power Restraint Policy

以中国沪深两市A股2008—2016年上市公司数据,通过检验"十八大"以来的权力约束政策对管理层权力与隐性腐败之间的关系影响,考察嵌入企业政治行为的政治治理机制对管理层行为的影响。实证结果发现:政治治理抑制了管理层权力与隐性腐败之间的正相关关系,且在国有企业更加明显。进一步检验发现,政治关联关系会使政治治理在国有企业发挥更加明显的监督效应。研究结论表明了"十八大"以来的权力约束政策发挥了企业外部监督的功能,提供了执政党政策制度的公司治理作用的经验证据,丰富了相关公司治理理论。

This paper uses the data of A-share listed companies in China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2016 to examine the impact of power restraint policy on the relationship between managerial power and hidden corruption since the 18th National Congress of the CPC of China.Further studies are made on finding out the impacts of political governance mechanism,which is embedded into the political behaviors of enterprises,on managerial behaviors.The empirical results show that political governance restraints the positive correlation between managerial power and hidden corruption,and the effect is more obvious in state-owned enterprises.Further tests show that political correlations make political governance play a more active supervision role in state-owned enterprises.The research conclusions indicate that power restraint policy plays the function of external supervision for enterprises since the 18th National Congress.The paper provides empirical evidence for the corporate governance of the ruling party’s governing system,which enriches relative theories of corporate governance.