碳交易额度初始分配的博弈分析

Game Analysis on the Initial Allocation of Carbon Trading Amount

在碳交易市场,初始的碳额度分配尤为重要,企业可以向政府隐瞒申报自身实际的减排能力,以获得较多的初始碳额。基于一系列基本假定,构建动态不完全信息模型对企业和政府的可能行为进行讨论,分析了政府和企业的最优策略,就如何公平有效地进行碳交易额度初始分配提出一些措施和建议。

In the carbon trading market,the initial allocation of carbon amount is particularly important,enterprises can hide their actual emission reduction capabilities to the government when declaring,to get more initial carbon amount.Based on a series of basic assumptions,construct dynamic incomplete information model to discuss the enterprise and government behavior,analyze the optimal strategy of the government and enterprises,put forward some measures and suggestions on how to fairly and efficiently make carbon trading amount of initial allocation.