股权激励与高管离职：管理层权力和产权性质对高管离职的影响

Equity Incentives and Executive Separation——On the influence of management power and property rights on executive turnover

以2006—2013年实施股权激励的A股上市公司为研究对象,采用TOBIT方法进行多元回归分析,对股权激励之于高管离职的影响进行了研究,并同时检验了管理层权力和产权性质对高管离职的作用。研究发现,股权激励对降低高管离职率确有显著效果,并且,管理层权力与高管离职率负相关,股权激励在非国有企业的高管留任作用比国有企业更好。进一步的研究发现,高管离职受股权激励方式的影响,即相比股票期权,用限制性股票实施股权激励,更能降低高管离职率。

This paper took a multiple regression analysis of the impact of equity incentives on executive resignation by using the TOBIT method,taking a-share listed companies with equity incentives in 2006-2013 as the research object.Besides,it examined the role of management power and property rights in executive turnover.The study found that equity incentives had a significant effect on reducing executive turnover,and that management power was negatively correlated with executive turnover,and that equity incentives were better for non-state-owned executives than state-owned companies.Further research found that executives’resignation was affected by equity incentives,equity incentives were implemented with restricted stocks compared to stock options,which could reduce executive turnover.