大学生网络行为失范的博弈模型与治理策略

Cyber Behavior Anomie of College Students:Game Model Analysis and Harnessing Strategy

大学生是网络人群中最大的群体,也是网络应用行为最为活跃的群体。大学生网络行为失范现象相当普遍。从博弈论视角看,大学生网络行为是大学生与监管部门的一场博弈。通过对博弈模型中混合策略纳什均衡的分析,揭示大学生与监管部门在网络行为博弈中的机理,表明大学生网络行为与个人效用、成本、刑罚等有直接关系,故此必须加强网络道德建设与网络安全教育,明确网络失范行为的风险与危害;加速推进网络行为立法,以法律为准绳严格监管网络行为;提升技术监管能力,及时发现处理网络行为失范,提高网络行为失范的成本;营造健康的网络环境,减少大学生网络行为失范的"破窗效应"。

College students are the largest and most active group in network users.Their cyber behavior anomie is also commonly found.In game theory,it is a game between college students and regulators.Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium analysis reveals the mechanism of such a game.It shows that college students cyber behavior is directly related to personal utility,cost,penalty and other factors.Based on this analysis,some measures are put forward to harness cyber behavior anomie,such as Internet security education,cyber behavior legislation,improvement of cyber supervision technology,and so on.