诚信、代理成本与家族企业的经理选择

Trust, Agent Costs and the Choice of Family Business

文章构建了家族企业与职业经理的博弈模型,将法律环境、企业资产的特性、职业经理背叛的一次性收益、集体惩戒机制、经理的耐心和代理关系的不确定性作为影响职业经理诚信的因素纳入模型。这些因素通过影响企业为诱使职业经理守信而必须向其支付的效率工资,进而影响雇用职业经理的代理成本。雇用职业经理带来的企业总收益的增加与其所引起的代理成本一起决定了企业雇用职业经理的临界规模。由此得出文章的核心命题:尽管职业经理的能力与家庭成员相比可能更强,但只有当企业规模大于临界规模时,企业才会选择雇用职业经理。

This paper presents a mode of game between family business and the professional manager in which legal environment, characteristics of business's assets, lump-sum income out of the professional manager's betrayal, collective discipline mechanism, patience of the professional manager and uncertainty of agency are included as factors influencing the trust of the professional manager. These factors influence the efficiency wage paid for the professional manager to insure he keeps his word and further influence the agent costs of employing the professional manager. The critical scale of employing a professional manager is determined by the increase of total benefits and costs of hiring a professional manager. Then the paper reaches the core proposition: although the professional manager may be more qualified than the family member, he is not hired until the scale of the business is larger than the critical one.