企业债务融资结构研究——一个基于代理成本的理论分析

A Research on Enterprise Debt Structure ——A Theoretical Analysis Based on Agency Cost

根据代理理论的解释,企业负债的原因是为了利用负债来约束股东与管理层之间的冲突,降低股权代理成本。但由于债务本身亦存在代理成本,因此,企业资本结构决策必须在股权代理成本与债务代理成本之间做出权衡。企业债务代理成本与债务结构存在紧密的联系。债务的期限结构、类型结构都将对代理成本的高低产生影响。企业债务中的债券具有的信号显示功能,有助于总体债务代理成本的降低。

According to agency theory, the cause of enterprise incurring debt is to ease up the conflict between the management and shareholders and limit equity agency cost by debt. For debt also has agency cost, an enterprise has to weigh between equity agency cost and debt agency cost when making capital structure decision. There exists a close relationship between enterprise debt agency debt and debt term structure. Debt term structure and debt category structure have an important effect on debt agency cost. Bonds in enterprise debts have signaling function, which can lower debt agency cost on the whole.