卢卡奇的存在论视域及其批判——《历史与阶级意识》的黑格尔主义定向

On Lukács' History and Class Consciousness

卢卡奇的《历史与阶级意识》 ,作为 2 0世纪最重要的关于马克思主义哲学的文献之一 ,其重要性首先在于存在论的根基方面。这部著作的成绩不仅在于抨击了“梅林—普列汉诺夫正统”对马克思哲学的解释定向 (特别指证了此一定向将马克思知性科学化的巨大危险 ) ,而且在于它实际上从多方面触到了至关重要也至为迫切的马克思哲学的存在论的根基问题。然而遗憾的是 ,这部著作本身对马克思哲学的阐释定向却止于黑格尔 :就其存在论境域的整体而言从属于黑格尔 ,就其零散突破的精妙见解而言复归于黑格尔。而这里的关键之处在于 :卢卡奇的这部著作未能真正理解形而上学之完成形式的根本前提及其全部天真性 ,未能由存在论的根基处击穿意识的内在性 ,未能决定性地终止存在论建构的知识论 (或“范畴方式”)

As one of the most significant documents on Marxist philosophy in the twentieth century, Lukács' History and Class Consciousness' importance lies, above all, in the aspect of the foundation of ontology. The achievements of this book are concerned not only with criticizing 'Mehring- П л e x a H o B 's orthodox ' explanative direction dealing with Marx's philosophy (especially pointing out the great danger of this direction treating Marx's understanding as an unchangeable subject), but in reality with the most important and urgent ontological foundation question of Marx's philosophy from many aspects. It is a pity, however, this book's own explanative direction towards Marx's philosophy ends at Hegel: it belongs to Hegel judged from the whole situation of its ontology; and it still belongs to Hegel judged from its many scattered wonderful viewpoints. The critical point here is that Lukács' work failed in really understanding the basic premises and the naive nature of the entire form of metaphysics, in puncturing the inner nature of consciousness, and in decisively terminating the epistemological (or 'notion method's') direction constructed by ontology.