隐性担保、补偿替代与政府债务——兼论我国的财政风险问题

Implicit Guarantees, Substitution of Buying Strategies and the Liabilities of Government: Reviewing Fiscal Risks in China

为保证渐进式改革顺利向深层次推进,同时维持财政预算平衡,我国政府以隐性担保这样的准财政补偿活动替代政府预算内的财政补偿活动,从而使我国财政表现出了较低的显性负债水平。但这种补偿替代策略的实施使政府积累了越来越多的隐性负债和或有负债,同时由于隐性担保缺乏有效的激励约束机制,道德风险的蔓延将进一步提高我国的财政风险。为有效控制财政风险,政府必须进行财政创新并对传统的隐性担保机制进行彻底的改造。

To ensure the gradual reform to go further smoothly, and to maintain the balance of fiscal budget at the same time, the Chinese government has taken implicit guarantees, which are quasi - fiscal 'buying' activities, to replace the explicit 'buying' activities within the fiscal budget. As a result, the explicit fiscal liabilities in China are at a relatively low level, but implicit and contingent liabilities have accumulated tremendously. Fur- thermore, as implicit guarantees suffer from the problem of incentive incompatibility, the resulting moral haz- ards will lead to even higher fiscal risks. To effectively control the up - going fiscal risks, the Chinese govern- ment should make fiscal innovations and restructure the implicit guarantee system.