摘要
本文从上游企业的角度出发,考察在一个连续双寡头的市场结构中,当下游市场需求相互独立,中间产品不完全替代时的纵向兼并竞争效应。发现参与兼并的企业通过纵向兼并可能降低中间产品价格,从而在损害上游竞争对手,降低其市场势力的基础上,降低了下游竞争对手的总成本。
Based on the upstream firms, this paper examines the competitive effects of vertical mergers in a successive duopolistic market structure with independent downstream demands and imperfect substitutional inputs. We find the vertical mergered firms can lower the inputs prices through vertical merger. And it causes the total costs of the downstream competitor to reduce while harming upstream competitor and eliminating its market power.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
2004年第1期47-50,55,共5页
Forecasting
关键词
纵向兼并
市场圈定
成本
vertical merger
market foreclosure
costs
