不完全合约下的产权、收益分配与市场风险——一个关于土地托管制的个案分析

Property Rights,Income Distribution and Market Risk under Incomplete Contracts——A case study on land trusteeship

本文在不完全合同理论视角和分析框架下考察了农业托管制问题。本文认为,托管制本质上是委托人和受托人所缔结的有关权利的合同,旨在降低经营风险、减少交易成本、生产成本、销售成本,提高产出率和各方盈利能力。托管制若要为交易双方所选择,需要其所带来的预期收益高于其他缔约结构导致的预期收益,并且需要通过合理设置托管价格避免合同不稳定。这是因为土地托管合同会因为不确定性因素(市场价格)而存在违约(敲竹杠)风险,因此需要将托管价格置于一个合理的区间以避免产生效率损失的行为。本文还指出,农产品的市场价格以及生产成本会影响企业(合作社)与农户选择托管制的程度。对于文中提出的命题,我们通过对调研中观察到的土地托管案例进行分析且予以了解释和验证。

This paper examines the issue of trusteeship in agricultural production under the perspective of incomplete contract theory.This article holds that the trusteeship system is essentially the relevant rights contract concluded by the trustor and the trustee,aiming to reduce business risks,reduce transaction costs,production costs,and sales costs,increase the output rate and the profitability of all parties.If the trusteeship system is chosen by the two parties in the transaction,the expected return it brings will be higher than the expected return caused by other contracting structures,and the trusteeship contract should properly set a price that will prevent the contract from becoming unstable.This is because the land-trusteeship contract is subject to default risk(hold-up)due to uncertainties(market prices).Therefore,it is necessary to place the trusteeship price within a reasonable range to avoid any loss of efficiency.This article also points out that the market price of the agricultural products and the production cost will affect the type of the land trusteeship contract that is chosen by the company(cooperative)and the farmers.For the propositions proposed in the article,we explained and verified them by analyzing the land trusteeship case observed in the survey.