信息披露制度、盈余管理与公司股价异动——基于中国制造业上市公司的证据

Information Disclosure Institution,Earnings Management and Transaction of Companies Stock Price——Based on Judy of Listed Companies from Chinese Manufacturing Industry

文章分析了信息披露、盈余管理与公司股价异动的内在机理,在此基础上,选取2007~2015年中国制造业上市公司数据,通过构建修正的琼斯模型与股价驱动模型,对盈余管理引发公司股价异动的有效性与趋势性进行了实证检验。研究表明:(1)控股股东对公司盈余信息的调控性披露是实现盈余管理的基本路径,控股股东通过控制盈余管理决策来实现对公司股价的调控目标;(2)盈余管理对公司股价具有显著的调控性,盈余管理方向与公司股价变动方向呈现同向性,盈余管理程度与公司股价变动幅度呈现正相关性;(3)盈余管理对公司股价的调控强度呈现加剧态势,而反映公司真实盈余水平的非调控性应计利润与经营性现金净流量对公司股价影响却呈现逐步减弱态势。该研究成果将为中国政府规范上市公司信息披露制度及盈余管理行为,实现中国证券市场的健康稳定发展,提供重要的理论指导与决策参考。

This paper analyses inner mechanism to information disclosure,earnings management and transaction of companies stock price,on basis of which,it gives the empirical research on effectiveness and trend of earnings management leading to transaction of companies stock price by selecting 2007-2015 year sample data from listed companies of Chinese manufacturing industry and constructing systematically modified Jones model and stock price driven model.This research result shows that:(1)Companies controlling shareholder’s applying to earnings management by manipulative disclosure to earnings information,which fulfills the goal of stock price manipulation by controlling companies decision-making.(2)Earnings management has a significant manipulation to stock price of listed companies.The direction of earnings management is familiar to the direction of stock price changing,and the degree of earnings management is positively correlated with the degree of stock price changing.(3)Manipulation intensity of earnings management to stock price shows an increasing trend,and non-manipulative accrual and operating cash flow both show a gradually weakening trend.