政府采购中专家独立评审问题研究

Research on Independence of Expert Evaluation in Government Procurement

尽管政府采购中专家独立评审的必要性问题不乏政策法规依据和学术探讨,但评审中围标、串标现象却时有发生,其关键原因在于,评审专家、采购人及代理机构并没有发挥独立评审的有效作用,只追求表面合规,甚至在评审中相互"合作"。该文基于成本收益理论对评审专家、采购人及代理机构的行为进行分析,提出设立匿名互评、第三方互审、违规档案、连带责任的有效激励机制,且创造独立评审环境,以确保评审独立性,提高财政资金的使用效率。

Although the need for independent evaluation of experts in government procurement has been supported by policies,regulations and academic discussions,the phenomenon of bidding enclosure and bidding strings occurs from time to time.The key reason is that the evaluation experts,purchasers and agencies do not play an effective role in independent evaluation,only pursue superficial compliance,and even ' cooperate with each other' in the evaluation.Based on the cost-benefit theory,this paper analyses the behavior of evaluation experts,purchasers and agents,and proposes to establish an effective incentive mechanism for anonymous mutual evaluation,third-party mutual review,irregularities files,joint liability,and create an independent evaluation environment to ensure the independence of evaluation and improve the efficiency of the use of financial funds.