摘要
研究采购商和供应商的偏好信息类型为偏好次序的多属性采购拍卖。首先,根据传统增价拍卖的基本原理,在采购方关于投标的偏好次序信息公开的情况下,设计一种多属性采购拍卖方法;然后,分析拍卖方法中供应商的理性投标策略,并研究拍卖方法的一些经济性质;最后,通过一个算例演示拍卖方法的运行,并验证拍卖方法的性质。主要研究结果是:本文给出的基于偏好次序信息的多属性采购拍卖机制是占优策略下激励相容的,且具有分配效率和Pareto效率。
Multi-attribute procurement auctions in which the preference information of the buyer and suppliers is represented by preference orders is studied in this paper.Firstly,according to the principle of the classical ascending auction,a multi-attribute procurement auction is designed on the basis of the assumption that the buyer' s preference order is public.Secondly,the rational bidding strategy is analyzed,and some economic properties of the auction are studied.At last,a numerical example is presented to illustrate how the auction works and verify the properties of the auction.The main results are as follows;the proposed auction model is incentively compatible with weakly dominant strategy,allocation efficient,and Pareto efficient.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第S1期368-373,共6页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(09YJC630229)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(31541110807)
关键词
多属性拍卖
次序偏好
投标策略
配置效率
PARETO最优
multi-attribute auction
ordinal preference
bidding strategy
allocation efficiency
pareto optimality