基于股权激励的上市公司委托-代理模型研究

Study on Principal-agent Model of Listed Companies Based on Equity Incentives

在对股权激励过程进行深入分析和提炼的基础上,在假设股票市场有效、股东风险中性、高管人员风险厌恶的条件下,以股东收益最大化为决策目标,建立数学模型、从理论上研究股权激励条件下的上市公司委托-代理关系。研究结果表明,在股权激励条件下,股东给予高管人员的最优股权数量、高管人员的最优努力水平以及股东和高管人员的均衡预期收益将随着高管人员能力水平的提高而增加,随着上市公司所处行业竞争激烈程度和市场环境不确定性程度的提高而减少。论文研究结果在一定程度上揭示了股权激励对上市公司委托-代理关系的影响机理,阐明了上市公司对高管人员的最优股权激励数量和高管人员付出的最优努力水平及其影响因素。

On the basis of deeply analyzing and refining the equity incentive process,under the assumptions that stock market is effective and shareholders are risk neutral and senior executives are risk averse,taking maximization of shareholders' return as decision objective,a mathematical model is set up to research principle-agent relationship of listed companies under equity incentives theoretically.The results show that,under equity incentives,the optimal equity incentive quantity of shareholders to senior executives,and senior executives' optimal effort level,and the total equilibrium expected return of shareholders and senior executives will increase in senior executives' abilities,and decrease in intensity of industry competition and uncertainty of market environment.The research results of this paper,to some extent,reveal the effective mechanism of equity incentives on the principle-agent relationship of listed companies,and clarify the optimal equity incentive quantity of shareholders to senior executives and senior executives' optimal effort level and their effect factors.