摘要
本文研究了在供应链采购中的多属性拍卖问题。买家使用逆向拍卖,以确定哪家供应商将被授予供应合同,以及相应的采购价格和采购数量。买方面对不确定的市场需求,而且只知道供应商的生产成本的先验分布。在报童模型的框架下,讨论了基于回购合同的多属性拍卖策略。在回购合同竞拍中,每个供应商的报价包含批发价格和回购价格两个参数,买方的期望效用是这两个参数的函数,并根据宣布的评分规则选择赢家。通过将二维拍卖模型转化为一维拍卖模型,推导出了供应商的均衡竞标策略。研究表明,当评分规则揭示买家的真实效用时,买家能通过供应商的竞标确定生产成本最低的供应商和达到供应链的协调。最后,通过数值分析研究了供应商的数量和生产成本对赢家和买方之间利润分配的影响。
Multidimensional auctions for procurement in supply chain settings are discussed in this paper.A buyer uses a reserves auction to determine which suppliers will be awarded the supply contract.Both the purchase price and the quantity are determined.Demand distribution are common knowledge,however the buyer only knows the prior distribution of suppliers' production cost.Under the setting of newsvendor model,a multi-attribute auction based on buy-back contracts is considered in this paper.In buy-back contract,each supplier will bid the wholesale price and the buy-back price.The expected utility of the buyer is a function of both terms in a bid.The buyer selects the winner according to the scoring rule.By transferring the two-dimensional auction model into a one-dimensional one,equilibrium bidding strategy for suppliers is derived.By revealing the buyers true utility function as the scoring rule,the supplier with the lowest production cost is selected and supply chain is always coordinated by the suppliers' bids.Numerical analysis shows the effect of the number of suppliers and the production cost on benefit share across the winning supplier and the buyer.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第S1期380-384,共5页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70801001
70701037)
中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助)项目(2010XNJ042)
关键词
供应链协调
多属性拍卖
回购合同
报童模型
supply chain coordination
multi-attribute auctions
buy-back contracts
newsvendor model