考虑逆向选择的国防装备采办合同定价模型

Model for the Defense Equipment Procurement Contract Pricing Considering Adverse Selection

针对信息不对称条件下,国防装备采办合同定价易出现逆向选择问题。基于委托代理理论,构建考虑逆向选择的国防装备采办合同定价策略模型,着重分析逆向选择对军方采办合同定价策略的影响,认为逆向选择降低了军方装备采办的效益,资源配置的最优水平发生了偏移。建议军方应适当降低对低技术水平承包商的努力要求,从而使高技术水平的承包商仍然按照最优努力水平工作,同时获得较小的信息租金,而低技术水平的承包商按照次优的努力水平工作,仅获得保留收入。

In order to solve the adverse selection problem during the defense equipment procurement contract pricing when asymmetric information exists,a principal-agent model for the defense equipment procurement contract pricing strategy considering adverse selection is established.The model focuses on the impact on military procurement contract pricing strategy caused by adverse selection.The results show that adverse selection reduces the military' s payoff and the optimal resource allocation changes.Therefore,the military should reduce the demand for the low technology-level contractors,which will promote the high technology-level contractors to work at the optimal effort level with less information rent and the low technology-level contractors to work at the suboptimal effort level with only retained payoff.