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考虑财政补贴的工业生态链均衡定价决策研究 被引量:5

An Equilibrium Pricing Policy in an Industrial Eco-chain under Financial Subsidies
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摘要 旨在促进工业生态链发展,有效减少资源消耗和废弃物排放,构建了政府、工业生态链上下游核心企业间的三阶段序贯博弈模型,据此研究了政府财政补贴下工业生态链上核心企业的均衡定价策略。采用逆序推断的方法,求解了三阶博弈模型的均衡解,并分析了政府财政补贴对工业生态链核心企业产品定价和副产品交易价格的影响。研究表明,财政补贴可以改善社会总福利和工业生态链的利润。同时,政府采取对核心企业均补贴的策略更优。通过合理分配补贴额度,有效调控副产品交易价格,能够缓解核心企业的利益冲突。 Inorder to promote the development of industrial ecological chain,and reduce the resource consumption and wastes emission effectively,an equilibrium pricing strategy for the core enterprises in an industrial ecological chain is studied based on a developed three-stage sequential game model for the government,upstream and downstream core enterprises under the financial subsides.The backward induction(BI) approach is used to obtain the equilibrium solutions.Subsequently,the impact of the financial subsides on the enterprises' optimal prices and of the by-product's optimal price is analyzed.The conclusion implies that the financial subsides can improve social welfare and promote the system profit of the ecological chain.Meanwhile,it is better for the government to provide the subsides to all the core enterprises than just one.The interest conflict can be relieved by the reasonable distribution of the subsides to influence the price of the by-product.
作者 陈军 杨影
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第S1期233-239,共7页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金青年基金资助项目(71301179) 教育部人文社科基金青年项目(20100092120041) 现代物流重庆市重点实验室开放基金资助项目(CQKLL12004)
关键词 工业生态链 财政补贴 序贯博弈 定价策略 industrial ecological chain financial subsides sequential game pricing strategy
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