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考虑在线补贴的零售商水平O2O供应链协调 被引量:30

Coordinating a Retailer's O2O Supply Chain under Online Subsidy
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摘要 O2O模式下的双渠道供应链颠覆了原来传统的渠道价格竞争模式,价格机制和补贴水平成为决策的关键要素。通过求解零售商水平O2O供应链利润函数,可以求出集中决策和批发价格契约下的O2O供应链渠道零售价格、销售数量、补贴水平以及供应链利润,然后设计出的两部定价契约可以协调分散决策时零售商主导的水平O2O供应链。研究表明,考虑价格补贴后的O2O供应链利润水平高于不考虑价格补贴时的O2O供应链,而两部定价契约可以协调零售商O2O供应链,单位最优补贴值随着在线市场规模的增加而减少,当在线渠道市场规模达到一定规模时,可以取消针对在线市场的补贴。 At present,the dual-channel supply chain under 020 mode completely changes price competition in the traditional channels.Price mechanism and subsidy level have been become main factors in the operation of 020 supply chains.Retail price,sales volume,subsidy level and the profit of supply chain under centralized decision-making and the wholesale-price contract can be calculate by solving retailer's 020 supply chain profit function.Then a two-part-tariff contract is designed to coordinate the decentralized supply chain.Research shows that,the profit level of 020 supply chain with price subsidies is higher than that without subsidies in 020 supply chain.The two-part-tariff contract can coordinate the supply chain and the unit optimal subsidy value decreases with the increase of the online market scale.When the market reaches a certain size,online market subsidies can be cancelled.
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第S1期479-484,共6页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71472026) 教育部人文社科基金资助项目(11YJA630174 12YJA630174) 高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20110185110022)
关键词 O2O供应链 补贴 两部定价契约 零售商主导 O2O supply chain subsidy two-part-tariff contract game theory
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