不同合作模式下供应链研发补贴动态博弈模型

Dynamic Game Model of R & D in Supply Chain under Different Cooperation

在包含两供应商和一制造商的供应链系统中,两供应商基于横向进行合作研发,制造商为激励两供应商而对它们进行合作补贴。考虑到在供应链研发中不同合作情况,把它们的合作分为完全不合作,半合作及完全合作三种情形,并建立了相应的研发合作动态博弈模型,接着采用逆向归纳法分析两供应商的研发绩效水平、制造商产量、中间产品价格、制造商对两供应商的研发补贴率、及三种情形下供应链总利润。结果表明,供应链中两供应商的最优研发绩效水平、制造商的最优产量、供应链系统总利润及各企业利润均是在完全合作下最大,半合作下次之,完全不合作下最小;半合作下的中间产品价格小于完全不合作下的中间产品价格;半合作下制造商对两供应商的研发补贴大于完全不合作下的研发补贴。

In the supply chain with two suppliers and a manufacturer,the two suppliers horizontally cooperate in R & D and manufacturer give subsidy to incentive two suppliers for their cooperation.Considering different cooperation situations in supply chain,three dynamic game models of R & D cooperation are developed under un-cooperation,semi-cooperation,cooperation settings.Then,the backward induction is adopted to solve three model problems for analyzing the two suppliers R & D performance,manufacturer production quantity,mid-product price,manufacturer subsidy rate for supplier and the total profit.The results show that the best situation come from the cooperation setting,followed by semi-cooperation and un-cooperation settings.Mid-product price under semi-cooperation is less than that of un-cooperation,amount of subsidy to supplier under semi-cooperation is more than that of un-cooperation.