基于前景理论的水污染事件防治行为演化博弈

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Water Pollution Incident Based on Prospect Theory

水污染事件属于突发事件的一种类型,如何防止水污染事件的发生是政府关注的重要生态问题。本文从地方政府的视角出发将前景理论引入水污染事件的监管研究中,运用演化博弈的方法研究地方政府和企业之间的博弈过程,得到防止水污染事件发生的约束条件及影响因素。同时,构建政策奖励浮动下企业水污染行为的影响模型,提出了在不同奖励下政府应采取的监管措施。研究结果表明:在一定条件下奖励政策可以对减少企业水污染行为的产生,同时政府奖励可能产生负面影响;政府奖励失效的情况下应加强执法和监管力度,增加对企业水污染行为的惩罚力度。

Water pollution incident is one of emergency,the government's task is to prevent water pollution incident happens.From the perspective of local governments,prospect theory is employed to the regulation of water pollution incident.The constraint conditions and influencing factors of preventing water pollution are obtained through evolutionary game.Moreover,a model is established to analyze the behavior of enterprise,regulatory measures are put out when the reward of government is different.The results show that under certain conditions reward policy can reduce water pollution behavior of enterprises,however,the rewards may have a negative impact.When the reward is useless,the government has to strengthen law enforcement and supervision and increase the penalties for water pollution behavior.