排他性支付工具市场的定价策略研究

Pricing Strategy of the Exclusive Market of Payment Instrument

支付工具市场的发展表现为不同支付工具间的替代。本文基于双边市场理论,针对排他性支付工具市场,构建商业利润最大化和社会福利最大化定价模型。结果显示:两种定价均对服务成本高(低)的支付工具制定更高(低)的价格;社会福利最大化定价偏向对服务成本低的支付工具制定更低的价格,且该差距随支付工具服务成本差越大而越大,当两种支付工具服务成本相同时,两种定价相同;更具倾向性的社会福利最大化定价将商业银行利润转移给了用户,从而通过网络效应推动低成本支付工具快速发展。基于理论研究结论案例分析了挪威支付工具市场历史交易量、成本、价格几者间的关系,反应了理论研究结论。研究有助于理解当前支付工具市场发展现象,为政府制定相关政策提供了理论支撑。

The replacement among different payment instruments usually happens during the development of the market. Based on the two-sided market theory,pricing models of two exclusive payment instruments are built,and the commercial bank maximized pricing strategy and social welfare maximized pricing strategy are analyzed. The main results show that the prices should reflect bank costs. The prices are influenced by the differences of bank cost between the two payment instruments. The price should be made higher when the payment instrument has higher bank cost. For payment instrument with lower bank cost,the social welfare maximized price is lower than the commercial bank maximized price. And the differences between social welfare maximized price and commercial bank maximized price is larger when the differences between the bank costs of two payment instrument is larger. The social welfare maximization pricing obviously transfers the bank's profit to the consumers,which is more conducive to the development of payment instrument with lower cost. Based on the results of theory models,it analyzes the development of payment instruments in Norway,which reflects the conclusions of theory models to some extent. The research helps understanding the development of the market with several payment instruments, and provides theory support for the government to make relevant policies.