季节性存货质押融资合作模式分析

Seasonal Inventory Impawn Financing Cooperation Pattern Analysis

中小微企业的大规模增加促使企业间的竞争向供应链间竞争转变,对供应链金融的风险控制水平提出了更高的要求,物流金融的发展和创新为银行等金融机构提供了有效管控风险的方式。本文研究了统一授信模式下供应商、销售商、物流企业三方组成的供应链在季节性存货质押融资中各方的决策行为,首先提出基本假设,在不合作与不同合作模式下构建资金约束下的非合作博弈模型,讨论销售商的再订购决策、物流企业的质押率决策间的博弈行为;然后基于夏普利值方法建立了联盟合作博弈模型,分析联盟合作存在的可能性,求解得出联盟收益分配方式;最后,进行了数值实验,验证结论。研究表明,在供应商作为核心企业市场竞争地位低于物流企业时,在一定情况下,通过合作能降低对销售商规模要求,并提高联盟收益。

The massively increasing of micro, small and medium enterprises is prompting the change between the competition of enterprises and supply chains, which put forward higher requirements to risk controlling level of supply chain financing. The development and innovation of logistics financing provides an effective way to control risks to banks and other financial institutions. This paper researches on the decision-making behavior of the supply chain members composed of a supplier, a distributor and a logistics enterprise under the unified credit granting mode and the case of seasonal inventory impawn. After hypothesized, we build a non-cooperative game model under the restriction of capital in non-cooperative and different cooperative modes respectively to discuss the gaming behaviors between the decision-making of the distributor's reorder and the logistics enterprise's loan-to-value ratio. Then, based on Shapley-ratio theory, we build the alliance cooperation game model to analyze the possibility of the existence of alliance cooperation and to solve the problem of distributing the total earnings of the alliance. Moreover, numerical experiment is carried to verify the conclusion. The results show that in certain cases when the status of the supplier( as the core enterprise) below the logistics enterprise, cooperating can reduce the request of distributor 's size and improve the union gains.